That there are significant definitional differences between languages is a statement of the obvious. It logically follows that definitional ambiguity occurs when translating a term from one language to another. The farreaching implications of this fact, however, are not as widely recognized. One word that has been and will continue to be significant is "warhead." This analysis (1) examines the different translations and definitions of the word "warhead" in English and Russian; (2) discusses the usage of "warhead" in the context of arms control; and (3) explores the implications definitional differences have for future negotiations. It specifically utilizes treaty texts, as well as the Helsinki agreement text, to construct a contextual use of "warhead." It is concluded that if US policymakers are committed to including nuclear explosive devices in START III force reductions, negotiators must identify and use a more specific term than warhead or ∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ (boyegolovka). Also included as an appendix are copies of the signed Helsinki agreement in both English and Russian.
Introduction
An important issue in international arms control negotiations is the precise and accurate translation of relevant terms. At most negotiating tables, certain words are assigned specific translations and meanings. However, outside negotiations, the implications of different translations are often overlooked. One word of special significance is "warhead." Although seemingly straightforward, its definition and usage is laden with assumptions. While shared assumptions are not consequential, differing assumptions can cause significant misunderstanding. The purpose of the following analysis is (1) to examine the different translations and definitions of the word "warhead" in English and Russian; (2) to discuss the usage of "warhead" in the context of arms control; and (3) to examine the implications definitional differences have for future negotiations.
Definitional Differences
That there are significant definitional differences between languages is a statement of the obvious. It logically follows that definitional ambiguity occurs when translating a term from one language to another. The farreaching implications of this fact, however, are not as widely recognized. One word that has been and will continue to be significant is "warhead." The following paragraphs examine commonly used definitions and translations of "warhead" and put them into context of a previous arms control negotiation. At this point, only the INF treaty is referenced, but START I & II may be incorporated at a later date. 1 Before discussing Russian translations, it is important to specify the definition of "warhead" in English in order to establish the US frame of reference. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines warhead as "the section of a missile containing the explosive, chemical, or incendiary charge." 2 Although this can be read as not necessarily including the explosive package, the assumption that it does is made by both the general public and those more closely involved in military and strategic issues. In fact, most in the nuclear community would be even more specific in their definition and refer only to the explosive device itself.
When "warhead" is translated into Russian, the results are much less definitive. The most common translation is ∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ (boyegolovka). 3 A less common and weak translation of ∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ (boyegolovka) is "reentry vehicle." 4 A Comparative Lexicon of US-Soviet Military Technical Terminology echoes this translation and adds the Soviet 5 definition: "Literally, the 'combat head' of a missile containing a single warhead." 6 It adds that ∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ (boyegolovka) is "an ambiguous word in ballistic missile terminology. . . This is similar to the common use of warhead to describe a warhead section, which actually contains the warhead(s), structural elements, and other components." 7 While the meaning of the word is vague, it is frequently included in treaty language.
For the purposes of the INF treaty, ∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ (boyegolovka) is translated as both "reentry vehicle" 8 and "warhead." 9 #≅,(≅:≅&8∀ (boyegolovka) is also used in the Helsinki Agreement in reference to "transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories," "destruction of strategic nuclear warheads," and "removing their nuclear warheads" (∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ -boyegolovka). 10 It should be readily apparent that at the very least, ∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ (boyegolovka) is a term that can be interpreted in various ways.
Another Russian term for "warhead," and probably the closest to the US English speaker's default use, is ∃≅,2∀∆β * (boyezaryad translated and defined in two different ways: (1) "weapon" (in the sense of 'nuclear weapon') -includes ballistic-missile and cruise-missile warheads, gravity bombs (Not to be translated as 'charge' in this context) 11 ; and (2) "warhead" -the nuclear, thermonuclear, conventional explosive or other charge within the warhead section or reentry vehicle of a missile or rocket. 12 #≅,2∀∆β * (boyezaryad) does not appear in the INF text, but is utilized twice in the Helsinki Agreement. First, it appears in reference to lowering the aggregate levels of "strategic nuclear warheads" (ΦΗ∆∀Η,(4Ρ,Φ84Ν β * ,>ΖΝ ∃≅,2∀∆β * ≅& -strategicheskikh yadernoykh boyezaryadov) to 2,000-2,500 by December 31, 2007. The second utilization is in reference to promoting the "irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads" ∃≅,2∀∆β * (boyezaryad). 13 As mentioned earlier, agreements are forged during negotiations as to the designated translations of certain terms. Difficulties in translation during the INF negotiations required the creation of a new term: β * ,∆>≅, 2∀∆β * >≅, ϑΦΗ∆≅6ΦΗ&≅ (yadernoye zaryadnoye ustroistvo), or "nuclear warhead device." This term refers specifically to the internal explosive components of the front section of the missile. α * ,∆>≅, 2∀∆β * >≅, ϑΦΗ∆≅6ΦΗ&≅ (yadernoye zaryadnoye ustroistvo) seems to mimic ∃≅,2∀∆β * (boyezaryad) in meaning. However, due to previous agreements, ∃≅,2∀∆β * (boyezaryad) was either designated as a term not specific enough, or the translation could not be reassigned, requiring the use of new term.
A Russian word occasionally translated as "warhead," and which appears frequently in treaty language is (≅:≅&>∀β Ρ∀ΦΗ∴ (golovnaya chast'). It is translated variously as front section, warhead, nose section, reentry vehicle, 14 post-boost vehicle and front-end (ABM interceptors). 15 A Comparative Lexicon defines (≅:≅&>∀β Ρ∀ΦΗ∴ (golovnaya chast') as "the forward section of a missile in which its warhead is usually located. . . It may contain one or more reentry vehicles as well as systems for guidance and detonation." 16 For the purposes of the INF treaty negotiations, (≅:≅&>∀β Ρ∀ΦΗ∴ (golovnaya chast') is strictly translated as "front section." 17 Indeed, consensus seems to have converged around the "front section" translation. Aid -1987 INF Treaty Glossary, p. iii It should be noted here that there can be significant overlap between ∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ (boyegolovka) and (≅:≅&>∀β Ρ∀ΦΗ∴ (golovnaya chast'). A Comparative Lexicon comments that originally ∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ (boyegolovka) "was synonymous with (≅:≅&>∀β Ρ∀ΦΗ∴ (golovnaya chast'), referring to the payload of a ballistic missile. However, as additional damage-producing components were included in the payload, these components within the (≅:≅&>∀β Ρ∀ΦΗ∴ (golovnaya chast') are also referred to as ∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ (boyegolovka)." 18 This not only reinforces the ambiguity of "warhead" translations in general, but specifically of ∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ (boyegolovka).
Dismantlement
Although somewhat separate from definitional and translation issues, dismantlement options regarding arms control are directly affected by the meanings attached to the terms of the treaty. For example, the INF treaty protocols indicate that the front section ((≅:≅&>∀β Ρ∀ΦΗ∴ -golovnaya chast') of the missile and reentry vehicles (∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ -boyegolovka) were to be destroyed, while the nuclear warhead device (β * ,∆>≅, 2∀∆β * >≅, ϑΦΗ∆≅6ΦΗ&≅ -yadernoye zaryadnoye ustroistvo) and guidance elements were permitted to be removed prior to elimination. Therefore, it can be argued that warheads (∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ -boyegolovka) were destroyed, while in fact the explosive elements (β * ,∆>≅, 2∀∆β * >≅, ϑΦΗ∆≅6ΦΗ&≅ -yadernoye zaryadnoye ustroistvo) were not.
The precedent set by INF negotiators relates directly to the language of the Helsinki Agreement. While the two presidents agreed to "destruction of strategic nuclear warheads," the translation of "warheads" is the Russian word (∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ -boyegolovka), the same as utilized in INF treaty language. It is therefore not specified, as should be obvious from the above discussion, whether destruction will include actual nuclear explosive devices or not. Unfortunately, this fact might not be clearly recognized. In a Helsinki press briefing, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger stated that "for the first time the parties will be negotiating on actual warhead destruction as opposed to simply systems destruction." 19 While NSA Berger is technically correct in stating that warheads are the focus of negotiation, his emphasis on "actual warhead destruction" seems to imply inclusion of the nuclear explosive device, which is simply not explicit in the agreement language. There are, in fact, many different methods of destruction, and as of yet, none have included the nuclear explosive device.
Implications
Definitionally, there are significant implications of this discussion for the Joint Parameters agreement made in Helsinki. First, according to the Russian translation, the two governments indeed agree to decrease the aggregate number of warheads (∃≅,2∀∆β * -boyezaryad). 20 Second, they agree that the "prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads" (∃≅,2∀∆β * -boyezaryad) is an example of a method to "promote the irreversibility of deep reductions." Irreversibility implies permanence; therefore, common sense would require destruction or dismantlement of nuclear explosive devices. At the same time, however, the parameters set here only agree to "promote" irreversibility, thereby not demanding it.
When referencing the destruction and transparency of warheads, the Russian translation in the Helsinki Agreement refrains from the specific reference to the explosive package and reverts to the more generic ∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ (boyegolovka). As such, it is a matter for negotiation how the number of warheads (∃≅,2∀∆β * -boyezaryad) is decreased --destruction may not necessarily include these parts. While a definitive conclusion can not be reached as to the specific meaning the Russian negotiators attached to ∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ (boyegolovka), it is definitely significant that the negotiators purposely used a different term when talking about destruction and transparency than that used to refer to lowering aggregate levels. It is therefore appropriate for Berger to argue that negotiation will focus on destruction of "actual warheads," 21 but in order for that destruction to physically occur, a more specific term than ∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ (boyegolovka) must be used.
In sum, the negotiators charged with maintaining the parameters set by the Helsinki Agreement must discuss decreasing the number of nuclear explosive devices possessed by both Russia and the United States. It is not required by the agreement language, however, to destroy the explosive packages or to be transparent in decreasing them. In fact, if "aggregate" refers only to deployed warheads, it may be enough just to take them out of service, although this does not promote irreversibility. Negotiators can be flexible in the manner in which they set above to decrease numbers. As in the INF treaty, they may remove the nuclear warhead devices (β * ,∆>≅, 2∀∆β * >≅, ϑΦΗ∆≅6ΦΗ&≅ -yadernoye zaryadnoye ustroistvo) and destroy the front section ((≅:≅&>∀β Ρ∀ΦΗ∴ -golovnaya chast'), including the reentry 20 It is not clear whether "aggregate" refers to total numbers of warheads or deployed numbers. 21 Press Briefing by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, and Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Larry Summers. Helsinki, Finland, March 21, 1997. vehicles (∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ -boyegolovka). This would technically fulfill the requirements of the agreement.
Conclusion
Within the English language the word "warhead" is somewhat ambiguous and laden with assumptions as to its meaning. The Russian is even more so, providing a variety of words that all translate as "warhead." This difference is in no place more apparent than the recent Helsinki agreement, where the English translation refers only to "warhead," while the Russian utilizes two separate terms. If US policymakers are committed to including nuclear explosive devices in START III force reductions, negotiators must identify and use a more specific term than warhead or ∃≅,(≅:≅&8∀ (boyegolovka).
While translation and definitional difficulties will always exist and provide challenges for negotiators, if the implications of these differences are appreciated, greater flexibility can be an unexpected and at times, undesired outgrowth. Specifically in reference to the term "warhead," awareness of semantic differences is vital, both by negotiators and the heads of state who must ultimately agree to treaty language that preserves the spirit of the negotiated agreement. 
